EVERY WEEK SINCE 1865

THE Nation

DECEMBER 31, 1955
20c

Soviet Economic Competition

Can Moscow Deliver?

by Peter Wiles

The Legality of H-Bomb Tests

by Emanuel Margolis

The French Elections

by Alexander Werth

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Letters

What's In a Name?

Dear Sirs: I was glad to read, in your editorial in the November 19 issue, that the alleged effort to make "capitalism" respectable by rechristening it "consumerism" has failed through consumer resistance. The renaming scheme is credited to Madison Avenue. If that report is correct, the name must have been spawned in some secret Communist cell located below the sidewalk level—the brainchild of conspirators who, after reading Veblen, thought of this subtle plan to destroy capitalism by means of semantics.

The dupes of this conspiracy—the upper-story and penthouse gentry of the Avenue—no doubt are mourning, especially as the failure follows the tarnishing and rubbing off of the similarly designed "free enterprise" label. What these publicity experts do not see is that the word "capitalism" persists because it is honest. The suggested substitutes all fail because they are dishonest. In my opinion the proper way to restore popular veneration of capitalism is to wash off the grime (or chisel it off) rather than rename the statue. However, if Madison Avenue genuinely believes that the evolving nature of the institution warrants a change, it can gain public acceptance only by going in the direction of still greater honesty. What about calling it "advertism?"

IRVING BRANT

Washington, D. C.

Middle East Crisis

Dear Sirs: The recent shipment of arms to Egypt by Czechoslovakia has alarmed many of us who were hoping for peace in the Near East. This new situation calls for an "agonizing reappraisal" of our vacillating policy in that area. While attempting to complete our alliances with the Arab nations, it was inevitable that the Soviet bloc should take advantage of every opening possible.

We must take a firm position and bear in mind that our security will not be furthered by an Arab alliance, as it would prove neither effective nor trustworthy. Egypt was not a dependable ally in the last war. The only way to insure genuine peace negotiations is to warn a would-be aggressor that Israel, too, may obtain arms. We must not stand by to see Israel defenseless in the face of a threatening Egypt encouraged by the Soviet bloc. The Western powers, in their own interest, must guarantee Israel's integrity against aggression not only on paper but in a manner that would assure swift and ready aid.

MILTON J. STEINHARDT, M. D.

Detroit, Mich.

Coming

The Big Guns: 1945-1955

A dramatic picture of America on the road to the garrison state

By Matthew Josephson

Another "Stalwart"

Dear Sirs: As an admirer of the Gilbert and Sullivan operas, I was delighted to read your tribute to the D'Oyly Carte Company in the October 15 issue. In referring to Peter Pratt, you mention that he has "inherited the roles once played by such stalwarts as George Grossmith and Martyn Green." The omission of Sir Henry Lytton's name in this connection is surprising; it was doubtless an oversight.

F. W. BURTON

Hucknall, Notts., England.

Disagree on Disarmament

Dear Sirs: John Bauer's helpful letter on disarmament in the November 22 issue leaves me skeptical. Of course, in this era of atomic and hydrogen weapons disarmament is a must if the race is to survive. But I doubt that it can be attained. Why does a nation arm? A government will tell its citizens and the world at large that it is arming for defense only. But a nation arms for the same reason that a footpad gets a blackjack—to go out and grab something. In spite of all the fine talk the Great Powers don't like the idea of disarmament. Exploitation of "inferior" races, meaning those with fewer guns than we have, would be a thing of the past. Colonialism and imperialism would go by the board, ditto Dulles's "position of strength." So I don't think the powers are quite ready to lay down the "white man's burden"—the sack of loot he brings home from the backward countries (which is one reason they're backward). No, I'm afraid disarmament is a long way off.

SAMUEL BUCK

New York, N. Y.

Dear Sirs: While I share the concern expressed in John Bauer's letter on the subject of disarmament, I don't find myself in agreement with his "peace proposal." Delegation of "police power" to the U. N. in the context of its present alignment is bound to make the U. N. an instrument of the bloc which commands the majority of the votes. The veto by Security Council members was placed in the Charter because this was foreseen, and at the time the United States supported the provision as much as the U. S. S. R.

At this stage in history, it is not only futile to believe that nations, especially large ones, will surrender their sovereignty voluntarily, it is destructive of the U. N. to press for Charter changes which would withdraw the veto. If such efforts at revision were successful, it would force out of the U. N. many nations (and not only the Soviet bloc), and we would have left a group which would be in basic agreement but it would no longer be the United Nations.

If I understand Mr. Bauer's thinking, he will say at this point: "Then no progress toward disarmament is possible." Progress is possible—emphatically so—via big-nation agreement. The best example, although some people who expected too much are turning sour, is the Geneva conference.

I would agree with Mr. Bauer—as who wouldn't—that grass-roots pressure is necessary. I would suggest as a most important step that we press our government to accept the Soviet offer to cease all atomic-bomb tests. Here is an agreement which does not require inspection and which if successfully carried out would inspire confidence and promote larger steps in the direction of disarmament.

MORRIS YANOFF

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THE Nation
EVERY WEEK SINCE 1865

U. N.—The Next Decade . . *by Edgar Snow*

IF THE first decade of the U. N. was largely dominated by the U. S., its second decade, which begins next week, promises a very different story. To Mr. Dulles and his U. N. delegate, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the 1955 session of the General Assembly must seem suddenly to have turned maverick. There was, for one thing, the underestimated Krishna Menon and his role as a *deus ex machina*—utilizing the neutralist position to organize new combinations of opposition which Mr. Lodge failed to anticipate. For another, our "solid South," the Latin Americans, exhibited an unwonted fickleness. But the heaviest blow to U. S. prestige came in the closing days of the session when sixteen new members were voted into the U. N. on conditions defined by Moscow.

U. N. "intransigence" had already been demonstrated during November by the marathon vote over a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. Mr. Lodge's instructions required him to back the Philippines. This was done without prior understanding with the British and other NATO powers and despite the ten-year-old "gentlemen's agreement" which conceded the seat to Eastern Europe. It was a poor moment for a test of strength. Britain, committed to Yugoslavia, was soon joined by the Communist bloc, as well as the "Bandung powers" and some Latin-American delegates. The subsequent deadlock ran through a record thirty-five ballots in the General Assembly. Yugoslavia and the Philippines finally agreed to alternate as occupants of the seat, but this compromise was reached only after the General Assembly and Security Council had meanwhile accepted a Soviet resolution on the unexpected "package deal" on new members. In all the backstage maneuvering, it was clear that never in U. N. history had U. S. initiative and dexterity been so faltering, if not altogether absent.

Some time ago thoughtful observers realized that pressure for admission of the excluded nations could not be contained once cold-war tension began to diminish. Whenever the Russians decided to bargain with their veto in order to seat their own satellites they would be able to name the terms of the exchange—unless before that time American diplomacy had won adherents to more attractive alternatives. Indeed the present writer pointed out in these columns more than two years ago that the time was late, but not too late, to reach agreements with a majority of the non-Communist powers on membership questions. The U. S. had to face the inevitable fact that Red China's delegates would soon have to be recognized in the U. N. on the basis of the principle of universality. It was suggested, therefore, that the U. S. could still work toward a "two-China" compromise, trading the admission of Japan, India or Italy (or all three) to the Security Council for Nationalist China's retirement to the General Assembly—where both the Formosan and Peking regimes might be confined until Formosa's fate could be determined under peaceful international or U. N. auspices. Other and perhaps more practicable possibilities existed. None was pursued. When the Russians called the hour, Mr. Lodge might just as well have been taken wholly by surprise.

THE NEW admissions mean an end to the "automatic majority" in the U. N. Before the Bandung conference the U. S. might have won the support of some of the newly chosen Asian states but by now they have been committed on key questions to Asian-Arab-African solidarity, largely under Indian influence. Chiang Kai-shek's use of the veto against Outer Mongolia has all but ended his pretensions to represent China. It will take adroit U. S. manipulating to get his credentials accepted in the next General Assembly. After that he will be lucky to retain a seat even as the governor of Formosa. Mr. Dulles must also accept responsibility for the situation which now compels the U. S. either to admit Outer Mongolia and Red China to the U. N. or be resigned to the exclusion of Japan—and continued heavy Soviet pressure to drive Japan into a neutralist corner.

Aside from the extraordinary lack of U. S. policy and tactical planning exposed by the U. N. "revolt," it may also be looked upon as a reflection of post-Geneva convictions among non-atomic powers that the danger of their own immolation in a hydrogen war has greatly diminished. After long-suffering silence they may now take delight in the luxury of asserting independent opinions. But opposition to the U. S. in the U. N. probably goes beyond that. It may be an expression of various degrees of disappointment or even boredom with certain static American attitudes toward the world's peacetime needs for change.

Three or four events of the past month illustrate how insensible we are to dramatic new facts in this most revolutionary era of human history, and how far we are sometimes from understanding the *mood* of the

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nations which Senator Knowland expects loyally to follow Republican leadership. Take the General Assembly's approval of the self-determination article proposed for the U. N. Covenant—and debated for a full month (after six years of committee discussion) before the voting. Mr. Dulles's deputy had all along vehemently opposed it. The argument in our case significantly differed from that of the major colonial powers, our NATO allies. It is not that we deny that "all peoples have the right to self-determination." The clause, "The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources" etc. was judged inadmissable by the U. S. In effect this means to reject the principle that a nation may nationalize or socialize privately owned property at the people's will. The vote of 33 to 12 put the U. S. in a minority in favor of old assumptions which colonial powers themselves disavow at home.

Then there was the case of Mr. Dulles and his gratuitous aid to Tovarish Khrushchev, about which the *Nation* has already commented (December 17). The reference is of course to Mr. Dulles' choice of Dr. Paulo Cunhua—of all people!—as the appropriate person with whom to associate U. S. policy in denouncing the "Soviet leaders now visiting Asia." By lending moral support to what he called "the Portuguese provinces in the Far East" Mr. Dulles helped confirm Khrushchev's distorted image of United States "imperialism." Asians did not fail to draw the inference that the U. S. recognizes not only Portuguese Asia but also Portuguese Africa—and all other colonial holdings on that continent—as mere "provinces" of Europe.

NOW, observe one or two other events which have nothing to do directly with foreign policy. In the state of Georgia—U. S. A., not U. S. S. R.—Governor Griffin called upon his board of regents to cancel a ball game between Georgia Tech and Pittsburgh because there was a Negro on the Pittsburgh team. After "prayerfully considering," the Georgia regents ruled in favor of total segregation in all future ball games held in states where segregation is law or custom.There is also the current attempt of the Virginia legislature to set the clock back by abolishing its proud and ancient public-school system rather than tolerate coeducation with colored children as decreed by the Supreme Court.

Such disparate facts are part of a general pattern of attitudes toward matters of human rights versus property rights, and of race and skin color, which has done the U. S. enormous harm in the U. N. It isn't that there are not other countries with attitudes more backward. It isn't that violations of human dignity far more evil don't exist behind the iron curtain. It is simply that ever since the establishment of U. N. headquarters here, and our avowed claims to "leadership of the free world," this country and all its behavior has been under the harsh revealing light of world scrutiny and comparison.

Can we as a nation consistently champion "self-determination" in Eastern Europe, yet insist that languishing colonies held as enclaves on one continent are really "provinces" of a country on another continent? Are we entitled to lecture older nations on international tolerance and cooperation when we have not yet overcome racial bigotry nor eliminated color discrimination as matters of official policy here at home?

In the past we commanded an "automatic majority" in the U. N. partly because of our dreaded thunderbolts; that monopoly has been broken. We commanded it also because of America's vast wealth and technological brilliance; but Europe has now recovered from its wounds. Technologically, Russia is drawing abreast of us; in educational opportunities it has moved ahead. We commanded a following because of our capacity to aid, and our unparalleled generosity in aiding; and for this we are still not forgotten by the poor and the weak. But the moral-political ascendancy we briefly held everywhere following World War II has now been largely dissipated—much of it lost under darkest McCarthyism. In those years the Great Doubt spread and deepened as the Administration stood immobilized while the world watched the spectacle of free men—including Cabinet members from Mr. Dulles down—tremble and appease the legions of primitive witchcraft lined up behind a cynical U. S. Senator and schoolboy clowns like Cohen and Schine.

WHILE AMERICA's easy dominance of the U. N. ends with 1955, still the loss need not mean catastrophe for ourselves or the organization. In the new U. N.—the U. N. of the seventy-six rather than the sixty nations—we shall need policies embodying far greater foresight and flexibility if we are to recover a forward-looking posture in the world. Now it is clear to all that U. N. membership is not conferred upon the morally righteous but rests solely upon the principle of universality. We helped bring this about by allying ourselves with any regime ready to verbalize support for our side in the cold war. This led us to the point where Dulles not only embraced Franco but sponsored him for U. N. membership. Just as logically it sent Russia's foremost potentates on a courting tour of India and Burma, where the philosophy and leading personalities of existing regimes are profoundly despised by all true followers of Lenin and Stalin.

Secondly, the dark-skinned nations in the U. N. now have acquired a strength which must command a new respect from all major military powers and ideological rivals. If necessary they may impose a plague on both houses of the mighty. Existing Asian-African members have been reinforced by Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Ceylon, Cambodia and Laos. They constitute the largest regional bloc—twenty-three nations—of votes. Nor is this the end. Even before Outer Mongolia, Japan, Korea and Vietnam enter the General Assembly, the Gold Coast, Morocco, Khartoum and Somaliland may soon be knocking for admission. A new permanent seat in the Security Council for one or more Asian states now

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becomes mandatory to reflect the new color composition of the U. N.—and the world.

Thirdly, the Latin-American vote, reduced to a quarter of the total U. N. poll but augmented as a linguistic bloc by the admission of Spain. Italy and Portugal, may drift farther away from, rather than closer toward, the U. S. All kinds of deals become possible. The Asian-Arab-African combination and the Latin Americans between them still hold a majority. Even more significant, the Asian-African bloc now needs only the enlarged Communist vote (nine powers strong), plus six independent votes, to make another majority. Among the new candidates only Spain, Portugal and possibly Italy may be relied upon to vote with the U. S. on any colonial issue.

Fourthly, the next U. N. decade may belong neither to the U. S. nor the U. S. S. R. but to powers capable of exploiting antagonisms between them. Certainly the period of cold peace or competitive coexistence now offers a buyers' market of seemingly unlimited credit for the geographically and politically in-between powers. They can hear bids from either side and—as in the case of India—take from both. But if the decade starts as the heyday of the neutralists, it can remain thus only as long as the general peace is kept.

Given the colonial condition of most of Africa, the semi-colonial condition of much of Asia, South America and Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union's new "perimeter-jumping tactics" to encourage nationalist and class wars away from her own borders, it would be surprising if the next ten years do not see a series of rebellions and revolutions. Will the U. S. be able consistently to cling to the position that suppression of civil war or colonial "provincial" revolt is a "purely internal affair" under any and all circumstances? Or will we try to persuade the U. N. to assume greater and greater authority—and thus submit ourselves, also, to its increased power as a de facto world *government*?

Speculation left aside, one thing seems certain. The answers provided by the U. N.'s second decade, the decade just beginning, won't be the answers of *anybody's* "automatic majority." And believers in democracy cannot but welcome this as a sign of growing strength and maturity in responsible internationalism.

The Shape of Things

The Satellite Sector

In addition to Mr. Wiles' article on p. 574 of this issue, much light is thrown on the ability of the Soviets to play the role of the basic provider of industrial equipment for such projects as the Aswan Dam by a report appearing in the October issue of *The World Today*. Despite its own dynamic industrialization, the Soviet Union is primarily the supplier of raw materials, food, and fuel in trade exchanges with the East European satellites. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a net importer of equipment from this area. As against $600-$700,000,000 worth of machinery imported in 1953 from the Communist area, the U. S. S. R. imported only $100,000,000 worth from the Western world. It is quite clear, therefore, that in strategic terms the Soviet Union is relying heavily on the industrial capacity and know-how of its East European satellites to make good its commitments to China, North Korea, Mongolia, and other Asian and Middle Eastern underdeveloped areas. There is, it should be noted, a highly effective specialization in the East European economies: Hungary in diesel locomotives and electrical apparatus, Poland in rolling stock and ocean-going ships, Czechoslovakia in machine tools (the industrial production of the Czechs has doubled since World War II). But it is interesting to note that although the Czechs made a net contribution to the intra-bloc pool of about $700-$800,000,000, the East Germany contribution in industrial products is even higher. Not only does this report shed considerable light on the Soviet Union's ability to make good on its commitments but it casts an even more revealing light on its political preoccupation with East Germany and the satellite countries. Any relaxation of the ideological cold war might, from the Soviet point of view, endanger the significant flow of machinery and equipment from Eastern Europe.

"Don't Call Me Moses"

The slate of candidates pledged to oppose the blacklist sponsored by the organization AWARE has won a resounding victory in the battle for control of the New York local of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (see: *The Nation*, September 3, 1955). Of thirty-five vacancies on the board, the insurgent anti-blacklisters have won twenty-seven and possibly twenty-nine positions (the ballots have not been fully tabulated). Impressed by this outstanding victory for decency and fair play we asked John Henry Faulk, spokesman for the winning middle-of-the-road slate, just how he would account for the upsurge of democratic strength in a union that seemed to have knuckled under to intimidation and job coercion. Mr. Faulk, who is that rare bird, a native Texan with a sense of moderation, told us that he had two outstanding impressions of the election: (1) that a widespread, blind, unreasoning fear of retaliation had inhibited the middle-of-the-roaders from voicing their abhorrence of blacklists prior to the elections but that (2) these elements had overwhelmed the extreme Right--and the extreme Left—once their basic convictions had been appealed to by leadership elements in whom they had confidence. This, it seems to us, is a parable to be noted by all Americans and in particular by the New York locals of the American Newspaper Guild. When we offered our congratulations to Mr. Faulk for a victory to which his own leadership had contributed, he replied: "Don't call me Moses." This too is the spirit in which all such congratulations should be acknowledged.

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Loans for Christmas

The rejection by Westinghouse Electric of proposals submitted by three governors—Averell Harriman of New York, Theodore McKeldin of Maryland and George Leader of Pennsylvania—to arbitrate the strike of 50,000 workers at forty of the company's ninety-eight plants which began on October 17, is a measure of management's confidence in victory. A similar indication of confidence is the offer of $1,500,000 in $100 Christmas loans to striking employees; thousands of strikers, with union approval, have been crossing picket lines to accept the loans. Parenthetically, the "loans for Christmas" proposal is a welcome change from the "starve 'em out" type of industrial warfare. In the wake of management's rejection of the arbitration proposals, the Department of Justice moved to have the independent U. E.—one of the striking unions—branded as "Communist-dominated" in a proceeding initiated before the Subversive Activities Control Board. The fact that U. E. is currently negotiating with the I. U. E.—the other striking union—for some type of consolidation or merger may help to explain the timing of this action. The strike has a complex background (see "The Westinghouse Strike" by William Jacobs, *The Nation*, November 19, 1955) but the issues which precipitated it have now been subordinated to the larger question: will the recently united labor movement permit this strike to be lost? The conflict could have been settled weeks ago if certain A. F. of L. unions, notably the Teamsters, had supported the strikers.

Duncan Aikman

Duncan Aikman, who died on December 14, was a first-rate journalist, witty, perceptive, shrewd, wide-ranging in his interests. His newspaper experience was varied and extensive. At various times he worked on the Springfield *Republican*, the New York *World*, El Paso *Times*, Los Angeles *Daily News*, Baltimore *Sun* and, as national-affairs editor, on *PM*. He wrote for many magazines and was a frequent contributor, on a wide variety of subjects, to the *American Mercury* under the editorship of Mr. Mencken. Among his better-known books were *Calamity Jane and the Lady Wildcats*, *The All-American Front* and *The Turning Stream*, the last a wise and far-sighted projection of trends and currents in American life that makes even better reading today than when it was published in 1948. To his friends, "Dunc" Aikman was a delightful companion, usually full of rambunctious nonsense, author of some of the world's funniest limericks and doggerel verse, mostly on sacred themes, which he mailed out in lieu of Christmas cards. He was part of the never-written, anecdotal history of American journalism which survives only in memories and half-forgotten episodes.

THE FRENCH ELECTIONS

Issues and the Line Up . . *by Alexander Werth*

Paris

IT IS often said that the French despise parliamentary government. But this is only a half-truth. When it comes to the point, they take parliament and general elections very seriously indeed. No one can doubt this who saw the long queues which gathered in front of every registration place on the final night for registering. Some of the newspapers, especially Mendes-France's *Express*, even suggested that the government was deliberately trying to sabotage registration in dread of the young voters who have reached twenty-one since the last general election four years ago.

ALEXANDER WERTH is the Paris correspondent of The Nation.

Although no worse time could be imagined than the beginning of January for an election (people's minds are normally fixed on the Christmas and New Year's festivities), there is undoubtedly a great interest in this one. The candidates fall roughly into three groups. In English terms one might describe them simply as Conservatives, Laborites and Communists, except that in France the matter is much more complicated.

The "conservatives" include all the parties of the classical Right, the so-called "Peasants," the Catholic M. R. P., the majority of the former Gaullists and those "Faure Radicals" who, expelled from the Mendes-France-dominated Radical Party, are now campaigning under the label of the Rally of Left Republicans, a loosely-knit organization that includes a variety of right-wing elements. (Note: if you see a French candidate calling himself "Left," don't believe it: sometimes the most die-hard conservatives call themselves "Left"—it's somehow considered more respectable and democratic.)

Among those who have been expelled from the Radical Party along with M. Faure are members of the ultra-colonialist fringe like Martinaud-Deplat and Rene Mayer, and members of the "McCarthyite" fringe like Jean-Paul David. The oddest case is that of M. Faure himself. The former Premier is a good liberal with decent instincts where colonial problems are concerned,

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and yet, by dissolving the Assembly as he did on December 1, he played into the hands of the die-hard conservatives and even of the Fascist fringe. What exactly his game is, nobody knows, perhaps not even himself—and we are not likely to know until after the election. If he has by then secured a great victory for the Right, he himself will be the first to be thrown overboard. If, on the other hand, the conservatives don't do as well as they now think they will, he may move a good deal further to the Left than where he now stands.

THE personal rivalry between him and Mendes-France undoubtedly had a lot to do with his decision to hold a snap election. He felt that Mendes-France was seeking through electoral-system reform, to dominate his party and to secure a left-wing majority for the Radicals of his own choice and for his Socialist allies. Mendes-France believes in hard-and-fast programs, in an "election platform," in a concrete housing scheme, in reform of the "drink" laws with all their rackets, and in a liberal policy in North Africa. Faure, who is a compromiser, thinks that Mendes-France doesn't make enough allowances for the easy-going ways of the French provincial, who doesn't like his habits too rudely upset.

The second major group in this election—roughly comparable to Britain's Labor Party—is composed chiefly of the Radicals who have subscribed to Mendes-France's program, together with the Socialists and a small "socially-minded" fringe of former followers of General de Gaulle. The third main group is composed of Communists and fellow travelers. The Communists urged the Socialists and the Mendes Radicals to enter into an electoral alliance with them, but the majority of the Socialists decided against it even at the risk of gaining fewer seats.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Two Frenchmen from Morocco

At the moment it is still uncertain how the system of alliances (familiar enough in French politics) will work in this election. In these alliances, two or more parties in a constituency agree on a single list of candidates for that constituency. It should be recalled that in 1951 an electoral law was passed under which candidates belonging to such allied parties got all the seats in a constituency (which average about five seats) if they polled more than fifty percent among them of all the votes cast. This led to the curious phenomenon that the Gaullist and Communist candidates (against whom the law was directed) failed to win a seat even when, as happened frequently, they secured three times as many votes as a successful candidate of one of the allied parties. The present indications are that the alliances—which in the last election chiefly benefited the Right, the Radicals, the M. R. P. and the Socialists at the expense of the Gaullists and Communists—are not going to play quite as important a role this time. The chief alliances are among the Right, the M. R. P. and the Faure Radicals, and between the Socialists and Mendes Radicals. There will probably be no common lists, as there were last time, between the Socialists and the Catholic M. R. P., since these two parties quarrelled over the Barange act almost immediately after the 1951 election. The act provides for state grants to religious schools, a question on which the Socialists, with their anticlerical tradition, feel very strongly. With the alliances working less effectively than last time, and with proportional representation applying in many places, the Communists are expected to win more than the ninety-five seats they obtained in 1951.

Apart from these three main groups there are some freak candidates, the most important of whom are members of the Poujade and Dorgeres organizations. These represent something very unparliamentary, not to say plainly Fascist, and are altogether pretty suspect. Dorgeres goes in for crude demagogy among the peasants, and Poujade among the shopkeepers, whom he urges not to pay their taxes. They have a particular loathing for Mendes-France who, in addition to being a Jew, is also reputed to be Enemy Number One of the 3,500,000 tax-free distillers (the wine-growers) of rural France, whom he considers more responsible than anyone else for the alcoholism in the French countryside.

Pierre Mendes-France

The chief campaign argument of the Socialists and Mendes Radicals runs as follows: "If you return to power the people who are responsible for the disaster of Dien Bien Phu and for the mess in Indo-China and for the housing shortage, things will go from bad to worse, and France will become involved in a major war in North Africa, and your son will be called up to fight the Arabs. It will be Indo-China all over again—only worse." The chief argument advanced by conservatives: "Under our rule economic conditions have been better than they were before. If the 'softies'—the Mendes men and the Socialists—take over, they are sure to lose North Africa altogether."

In this context, North Africa and housing are the two chief election issues. The most common forecast is that the conservatives will win but without obtaining a stable majority. In such a case it is likely that many of the "conservative" deputies may ultimately go over in the new Parliament to the side of Mendes-France and the Socialists.

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LEGALITY OF BOMB TESTS

International Aspects . . . *by Emanuel Margolis*

The U. S. will conduct further thermonuclear tests in the Marshall Islands area in 1956 and the British will do likewise in the Australian desert. These facts, together with the recent Soviet tests, prompt the question: are the tests legal under international law? The warning of the genetic dangers involved voiced by Thomas E. Murray of the A. E. C. and the U. N.'s decision to study the radioactive effects of bomb tests were made subsequent to publication of Mr. Margolis's article in the Yale Law Journal *of April, 1955.* The Nation *herewith publishes a condensed version of the article.*

THE HYDROGEN bomb shot set off by the United States on March 1, 1954, was a shot heard 'round the world. Like certain of the physical results of this thermonuclear experiment, the political "cloud" and the legal "fallout" the explosion precipitated were not anticipated fully.

A number of Japanese fishermen and several hundred Marshall Islanders were seriously injured; one of the fishermen died from radiation sickness six months later. The Marshallese detonated an explosion of their own at the United Nations by petitioning the Trusteeship Council for an end to the tests, or failing that, for guarantees of strict safety measures. A growing crescendo of world opinion asked that these tests (indeed *all* thermonuclear tests by *all* countries) be discontinued, pending careful study of the extremely serious after-effects of such detonations. What was perhaps the grimmest warning from the scientists was that of Professor Sturtevant, one of the world's leading geneticists, who calculated that *at least* (and he made every effort to be conservative) 1,800 of the 90,000,000 children born in the world last year were adversely affected genetically by radiation from thermonuclear tests. "The true value," he said, "could possibly be 100 times greater."

The political, scientific, and moral implications of these thermonuclear tests have loomed so large that little attention has been paid to the serious issues of law which the United States' tests have raised. Yet some of the oldest and most widely accepted principles of international law are involved: freedom of the seas and of navigation upon them, and freedom from interference with the lawful pursuit of maritime industries—as well as the more modern principles of law embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Freedom of the Seas. The United States has been conducting tests with atomic weapons in the Marshall Islands since 1946, employing the atolls of Bikini and Eniwetok as its main proving grounds. Preparatory to the test series of March-April, 1954, the so-called "danger area" surrounding these two atolls was enlarged, forming a rectangle of open sea around them of some 50,000 square miles. After the March 1 explosion and the exposure of the Japanese fishermen and Marshallese to harmful radiation and the continuous stream of reports from Japan describing confiscation of considerable quantities of fish by the Japanese government, the "danger area" was expanded several times in magnitude so that it encompassed some 400,000 square miles.

Speaking in the House of Lords, Earl Jowitt, a legal authority of great stature, called attention to the dubious legal validity of such measures. "The fact that the area which may be affected is so enormous," he declared, "at once brings this problem: that ships on their lawful occasions may be going through these waters, and you have no right under international law, I presume, to warn people off." This principle, a cornerstone of international law which was laid at the latest as far back as Queen Elizabeth (some scholars have traced its beginning to the twelfth century) is the universally recognized one of freedom of the seas and freedom of navigation upon them. Indeed, traditionally, the United States has been among its leading champions and defenders, and it is no coincidence that it occupied so prominent a place both in Wilson's "Fourteen Points" and in the Roosevelt-Churchill "Atlantic Charter."

Three centuries of historical growth have given stature and form to the principle of freedom of the seas, and four distinct legal aspects are now recognized: *a.* freedom of navigation, *b.* freedom of fisheries, *c.* freedom to lay submarine cables, and *d.* freedom of aerial movement. These "four freedoms of the high seas" are absolute, except to the extent that international custom and treaties have modified them in minor respects in order to meet the needs of an increasingly "smaller" and dynamic international society. Thus, freedom of the seas, not unlike constitutional guarantees of freedom, was never intended to mean, nor has it become, total absence of restraint.

There are laws which govern the conduct of states and their nationals upon the high seas in time of peace. Custom and treaties have established rules of the road, and laws govern jurisdiction over public and private vessels, collisions, repression of piracy, measures of self-defense, conservation of fisheries, jurisdiction over the three-mile maritime belt, and so on. International usage would also appear to be giving increasing recognition in recent years to the claims of states to jurisdiction over so-called "contiguous zones" beyond the three-mile territorial belt for purposes of enforcement of customs, immigration, sanitation, or police regulations—but these zones have rarely exceeded four leagues (twelve marine miles) from the coast.

The legal problem posed by the Pacific experiments, therefore, is whether these rules of law are compatible with the placing of hundreds of thousands of square miles of the

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Old and New H-Bomb Testing Areas



Pacific Ocean "off limits" to all but United States ships and planes. Such an arrogation of authority in peacetime, albeit only for several months at a time, finds no basis in international custom or in treaties which have been the only vehicles for modifying the law of nations for centuries. The only treaty having the slightest modicum of bearing on the subject is the "Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands" which includes the Marshall Islands. Article 13 of this treaty authorizes the United States as Administering Authority to close off any or all of these islands, including their territorial waters. But nowhere does the agreement say anything about the sea and air space *beyond* the islands' territorial limits. The rights of other states and their nationals to use such areas of the high seas remain untouched and undiminished under this treaty.

The U. N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. Another, and unquestionably more rigorous, legal framework within which the legal character of the Pacific tests should be measured is the United States' treaty obligations.

The U. N. Charter imposes upon member-states who are administering "non-self-governing territories" (including areas under trusteeship) the obligation to accept as a "sacred trust" the promotion of the well-being" of the territories' inhabitants "to the utmost"; it establishes "the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount" (Article 73).

Article 6 of the "Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands" is still more specific. The Administering Authority must promote the "economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants"—a goal which is to be realized by encouraging "the development of fisheries, agriculture, and industries" and by protecting the inhabitants against the "loss of their lands and resources." It must also protect the health of the inhabitants. These duties, it should be noted, are unqualified imperatives. They are preceded by the word "shall" and are not diluted by the phrase "subject to the requirements of security" which qualifies several other key articles of the agreement. (The Pacific Trust Territory has been designated as "strategic," the only trusteeship area which has been placed in such a category.)

The thermonuclear test of March 1, 1954, exposed 236 Marshallese and twenty-eight United States personnel to radiation, as a result of an unexpected shift in the winds which placed Rongelap, Rongerik, and Uterik Islands in the path of the fall-out. Months afterward, many of them were still suffering from lowered blood count, burns, nausea, and loss of hair. Nor were all of these injuries caused directly by fall-out. Some were affected by drinking water which had become dangerous.

The loss of their lands has been almost equally painful for a far greater number of inhabitants. In their petition to the United Nations (April 20, 1954) the Marshallese pointed out that the Japanese took away the best portions of six atolls, that only one island of these atolls had been returned to them, that Bikini had been taken away as well, and that other islands had been made radioactive by the thermonuclear tests and their inhabitants subsequently relocated.

Marshallese industries have apparently suffered as well. The Bikini people, whose primary occupation was fishing, have been removed to Kili Island where there is no fishing for seven months of the year because high surf makes it almost impossible to land on the island. Kili is now called "the island of hungry people."

Such developments are hardly reconcilable with the provisions of the U. N. Charter, much less the express stipulations of Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement, quoted above. True, under Article 5 of the agreement, the United States has the right to station armed forces and erect fortifications there, and under Article 13 to close off part or all of the Territory for "security reasons." But these rights of the Administering Authority are coupled with duties toward the inhabitants of the area which are so clearly spelled out that their plain meaning defies distortion.

Conclusion. The United States has traditionally prided itself on its adherence to the fundamental principles of international law. We have tried to remain in the forefront of those states who insist on strict observance of treaty obligations. The facts surrounding our thermonuclear experiments in the Pacific are glaringly inconsistent with the leading

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role this country has played in defense of freedom of the seas, as well as our professions of loyalty to U. N. Charter principles which include "respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law."

The United States has no present intention of halting the Pacific tests, although we have promised to do everything possible to prevent further injuries or damage. The official justification for continuing the tests appears to rest on the politico-military argument that "no one could reasonably contend that the Soviets should be the only nation to conduct nuclear experiments," to quote a United States delegate to the U. N. a year ago. And a further contention is that there is nowhere else within the jurisdiction of the United States that H-bomb tests "could be successfully conducted with less danger."

In the absence of an international agreement on disarmament or, setting the sights lower, an agreement barring further thermonuclear detonations by all countries pending a U. N. investigation of their effects, the experiments will undoubtedly continue. If they do, this nation confronts the task of carrying them on in conformity with its legal obligations. Arguments of expediency couched in terms of defending the free world and human dignity become specious when placed against the clear requirements of the relevant rules of law and, by implication, of morality.

The conclusion seems inescapable: the laws of humanity suggest and the law of nations requires immediate and permanent cessation of the thermonuclear experiments in the vast expanse of the Marshall Islands proving grounds.

EXPERIMENT IN OPERA

Chicago Tries Again . . *by Howard Talley*

Chicago

IN TWO SEASONS The Lyric Theatre Grand Opera of Chicago has earned a reputation for musical competence quite frequently rising to excellence and for remarkable enterprise in obtaining renowned singers and staging new or novel works. By these means it has enlisted box-office and institutional support that makes its future, if not secure, at least promising. Considering the doleful history of opera in Chicago, this is a good start—better perhaps than many would have forecast.

Several operatic ventures, each with a different name, beginning with the Chicago Grand Opera, 1910-13, have flourished and expired in this city. The vicissitudes of opera companies since then are too varied and numerous to discuss here. One general conclusion covers them all: opera in Chicago is too delicate a bloom to survive the blasts of ill fortune from whatever source. It lacks, and always has lacked, even the minimal public enthusiasm that has kept the Metropolitan going (with recurring crises) in New York. Chicago has an impressive and even glamorous facade skirting Lake Michigan; behind are square miles of humdrum walk-up apartment houses, private dwellings, smoke-belching factories, stockyards, with, here and there, oases of parkland.

So long as opera was housed in the Auditorium on the lake front it was supported by society and by interested opera-goers to whom the Auditorium was accessible by public transportation. When Samuel Insull underwrote the deficits of his Chicago Civic Opera Company, 1922-32, he erected for it a gigantic building on the west side of the Loop. Society and commoners grudgingly followed, protesting the fierce blasts that swept up Madison Street from the Chicago River. Since the crash of the Insull empire, sporadic attempts have been made to revive opera in Chicago. The latest—and we hope it will be lasting—is the Lyric Theatre, brought into being last year by two young people, Carol Fox and Lawrence Kelly, with a young music director, Nicola Rescigno.

The Lyric Theatre based its formula for success on what was learned from the attempt to reestablish opera in 1947. In that year the Chicago Music Foundation and the New York City Opera arranged to bring the latter's productions to Chicago. This lasted for six seasons. The New York company presented generally well-rehearsed performances, some in English, with well-schooled but relatively unknown singers. Attendance rose slowly from season to season in the face of a hostile press. But the growth was not sharp enough to offset expenses. The Lyric Theatre then decided that to launch an opera company that could hope for public and private support indefinitely, it would have to provide at least a few interntaional and national stars among leading singers of lesser renown, a roster of experienced and competent singers of secondary roles, a large and well-trained chorus, a ballet group with a few premier danseurs, staging, costumes and scenery at least up to New York Metropolitan standards, an orchestra of symphonic proportions and caliber, led by a first-rate conducting staff, and a repertory of operas selected from the national schools of Italy, France and Germany which would also include one or more novelties each season.

How has the Lyric Theatre coped with this bill of essentials during the season just ended? In regard to the first, it has been remarkable, securing the services of leading La Scala singers—Maria Callas, Renata Tebaldi, Ebe Stignani, Rosanna Carteri, Guiseppe di Stefano, Tito Gobbi and Nicola Rossi-Lemeni; some Metropolitan artists, Dorothy Kirsten, Astrid Varnay, Jussi Bjor-

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ling, Ettore Bastianini, Robert Weede and, from the Vienna Staatsoper, Teresa Stich-Randall. Unfortunately the two leading feminine stars, Callas and Tebaldi, could appear during the first two weeks only; upon their departure the box-office thermometer sagged slightly.

The roster of secondary singers was unusually strong for a young company. Among these, Claramae Turner, Eunice Alberts (for her role of Martha in *Faust*) Mariano Caruso, William Wilderman, Kenneth Smith and Lloyd Harris were outstanding. Mr. Wilderman had, perhaps, the best bass voice in the entire company; Andrew Foldi was the best of the locally engaged artists.

The chorus of seventy voices, augmented to 108 in *Aida,* was well trained under the direction of Michael Lepore, but lacked robustness. With such a large auditorium as the Civic Opera House to fill, they might have been allowed on some occasions, as in the "Soldiers' Chorus" from *Faust,* to come to the footlights and give out with gusto; it is customary at the Metropolitan.

THE Lyric Theatre took a big step in offering a complete ballet company in special productions featuring Alicia Markova, Vera Zorina, Sonia Arova, Oleg Briansky and Bentley Stone, with choreography by Ruth Page.

The staging of the opera and ballet productions was entrusted to William Wymetal (an old Met man), Vladimir Rosing of Eastman School American Opera fame, Aldo Vassalo, Hizi Uoyke *(Madame Butterfly)* and Richard Baldridge. Gerard Ritholz designed the ballet-masque, Monteverde's *Il Ballo Delle Ingrate* and de Banfield's one-act opera, *Lord Byron's Love Letter.* Scenery and costumes for *The Merry Widow* were by Rolf Gerard, the production staged by Hassard Short. For the standard operatic productions the company is still falling back on old sets inherited from the Civic Opera Company, with the exception of *I Puritani,* the sets for which were built in Rome and assembled in Chicago.

At first the orchestra sounded crude and ill-assorted, but it evolved into a rich and flexible instrument under the hands of the veteran Tullio Serafin, another La Scala import and formerly with the Metropolitan,



and Nicola Rescigno. The orchestral work in *Butterfly, Lord Byron's Love Letter,* and, above all, in *L'Amore dei Tre Re* was good by any standard.

The repertory was not as broad as one would expect of a major, well-established company. It leaned heavily on the tried-and-true Italian staples, *Aida, Il Trovatore, La Boheme, Butterfly, Rigoletto, Un Ballo in Maschera* and *Cavalleria Rusticana,* but provided in addition excellent performances of *I Puritani,* Puccini's *Il Tabarro,* Donizetti's *L'Elisir d'Amore,* and the aforementioned *L'Amore dei Tre Re.* Gounod's *Faust* was the sole offering in French and there was no German opera at all. The sole American offering was the one-act novelty *Lord Byron's Love Letter.* The newness of the company and the limitations of its financial resources explain its one-sided repertory, a condition that should improve with time and good fortune. It speaks well for the Lyric Theatre that it had the courage in its second season to present such dubious box-office ventures as the two ballets—*The Merry Widow* and *Revanche,* based on Verdi's *Il Trovatore*—and the *Love Letter.*

Using the Metropolitan as a convenient if arbitrary standard, no production in Chicago this second season fell below the level of an off-night in the New York house, with the exception of the repeat performance of *Cavalleria.* A few others were inferior to the Met's best work, notably *Butterfly* which, although a box office sellout on the strength of Callas, did not come up to the dramatic potential of its heart-breaking story, largely because of the star's tentative and vocally ineffective performance. *Faust* was also below par, despite fine singing by Jussi Bjoerling. The nimble antics of Rossi-Lemeni as Mephistopheles did not offset his vocal deficiency in that part, and Rosanna Carteri was more pleasant to look at than to hear.

Aida, Il Trovatore, Rigoletto, L'Elisir d'Amore, La Boheme and *Un Ballo in Maschera* were superior to what the Met offers today—they were perhaps even at La Scala level. The operas not mentioned were just about at the New York par.

Though there were a few mistakes in casting that are unavoidable when you are tailoring a repertory to a few featured artists, in many of the productions even the smaller roles were taken by singers who had voices rich and full enough for the huge building. This was evidently not the case the last season, when vigorous criticism was directed toward inept performances in the smaller roles. The management has rounded out its casts with performers who at least do not excite the scorn of the spectators.

AMONG the leading singers new this year to Chicago, Renata Tabaldi comes first to mind. In *Aida* and *Boheme* she amply justified her great reputation. Teresa Stich-Randall's singing of Gilda in *Rigoletto* was so pure and effortless that I hope we shall hear her next year in more roles as well suited to her talents. The final week brought forth a sensational young star, Anita Cerquetti, in *The Masked Ball.* Junoesque in figure, with voice to match, she seems destined to become another Rosa Ponselle. When she has fully developed her high register she will have little difficulty in singing the Ponselle roles.

On the business side the picture is less bright, though not desperate. The season began with the first two weeks sold out, and with good prospect for 90 per cent houses in the remaining three. But when the stars departed after the first heady fortnight, business slumped. The public was reluctant to buy an opera, however famous, without correspondingly famous names. In almost every

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case, however, repeat performances had much better attendance than premieres. Thus, the first *L'Amore* was 65 per cent sold, the second 90 per cent. Even more notable was the case of *The Masked Ball.* It opened to about a two-thirds house, but the word got around that a promising young singer was appearing in perhaps the best production of the season, and the repeat performance, on the last night, was packed.

A fund of about $100,000 was raised this year from business and private sources (gifts larger than $1,000 and as small as $1) to meet the expected deficit. The books will thus balance, but just balance, and the fund-raising will have to be done all over again next year. It won't get easier, but Miss Fox and Mr. Kelly are indomitable entrepreneurs.

The audiences were interesting. As far as one could tell they were not mainly composed of the "top" layer of society. This group has died off, moved to the suburbs, or its younger members are no longer much interested in cultural enterprises, except that they go to the symphony as regularly as their forebears went to church. The downstairs section of the audience seemed to be made up of prosperous middle-class business and professional people—a group that does not belong to the North Side social set. A by no means negligible portion came from the cities and towns surrounding Chicago; there were groups from Milwaukee, Madison, Minneapolis and many other smaller communities. A good percentage of them seemed to be hearing opera in the flesh for the first time. Their enthusiasm was genuine but undiscriminating. They applauded the rise of the curtain on an act, the first appearance of a well-known singer whether or not he was singing, any retained high note, whether in the middle or at the end of an aria. History repeats itself—the audiences in the new Venetian theatres of the seventeenth century acted in the same way though more reprehensibly. A new audience has discovered opera and likes it; what effect their support will have on the old and tradition-bound art remains to be seen.

AS OF now what has the new company to look forward to next season? It has a friendly press, a favorably-disposed public. It has awakened an interest in business men who are now aware that the Lyric Theatre is good for Chicago business. It has the good will, if not the financial support, of the municipal government. It has youth and vitality, the courage and enterprise to seek new sources of revenue from corporations and some of the national foundations as well as from the general public. Though no official announcements are yet forthcoming, it is understood that the next opera season will begin October 15, well before the national election and will run five to seven weeks. An attempt will be made to secure well-known stars to appear throughout the season. The scale will become increasingly lavish, for the people of Chicago have shown again and again that they will accept nothing less.

SOVIET COMPETITION

Can Moscow Deliver? . . . *by Peter Wiles*

The Soviet Union's foreign policy is keyed increasingly to "foreign aid" (see editorial note on page 567). The question arises as to whether the Russian economy is strong enough to support such a policy—either alone or with the help of the satellite states. Peter Wiles is a noted British economist and a Fellow of New College, Oxford.

IT IS a great mistake to judge economic systems only, or even mainly, by the justice or injustice with which they distribute wealth among individuals and classes; by their adaptability to consumer demand or their economic "rationality"; or by the political and social relationships to which they give rise. The most important criterion is more materialistic and less sophisticated: how much does the economic system produce per head? For the principal object, after all, of economic activity is to satisfy human wants; and these being almost limitless, the best way to satisfy them is to produce a great deal of everything.

Perhaps the most important fact in all modern economics is that the rate of growth of productivity is higher in the Soviet Union than in any important non-Communist country even at the period of its maximum development, let alone now. The best performance by a large non-Communist economy over a long period appears to be that of Japan between 1912 and 1937, when its productivity grew by about 3 per cent per annum. The Soviet economy showed an increase of approximately 5.5 per cent annually before the war and has been growing by about 7.5 per cent since 1948. In mining and manufacturing alone—and this sector usually outstrips all others in any economy—the figures are: Japan, 7 per cent; U. S. S. R., 12 per cent.

The overwhelming Communist superiority in industry leads to an overall superiority in the national income. The effect of compound interest is very great over a few decades. Thus, growing 3 per cent per annum faster than the United States, the U. S. S. R., starting with half the United States national per capita income, could catch up in twenty-three years.

What is the cause of this superiority? There is nothing comforting here to the anti-Communist. It is not just because the satellites have been exploited: their own economies are expanding at an almost equal rate, and Soviet exploitation is offset by Soviet subsidies to China. In any

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case this would not explain prewar Soviet growth. Again it is not because the Soviet economy, technically stagnant until well into the twentieth century, had only had to apply methods known elsewhere to cover in one easy technical leap a century of hard-won Western progress. For such a leap is beset with every social and economic difficulty: all backward economies stand equally before it, but only those under Communist rule have managed it.

The reasons for Communist industrial progress are to be sought in Communist industrial efficiency. First, there is the planning system itself: targets are set, in physical or financial terms, which each ministry, trust, factory and individual worker must beat. The targets are raised year by year, and the obligation to surpass them has quasi-legal force. This is the principal aim and result of the whole planning system. Nor does the legal stick exclude the monetary carrot. Taxes are not highly progressive: the highest marginal rate of income tax is only 13 per cent, and direct taxes fall most heavily on food, not manufactured luxuries. Third, the system of ownership helps efficiency. Factories can, in theory, be combined, processes transferred from one to another, and specialization and standardization imposed by mere fiat. There are no obstacles of property law, shareholders' vested interests, etc.; all industry is treated as one big trust.

Fourth, communism wholly emasculates the trade unions. The influence exercised by a labor monopoly over wages, hours, conditions of work, apprenticeship, hiring, craft demarcations, indeed over almost everything, is restrictive. At almost no point can a union raise efficiency: it can at most—with significant exceptions in the American garment trades—not hinder it. All these obstacles are swept aside under communism. The union follows mechanically the party line on industrial matters. It loses all bargaining power except in the field of welfare outside of working hours; it becomes a cheerleader, an organizer of productivity and promoter of enthusiasm. If the authorities want the norms raised they get the trade unions to get the workers to propose it "spontaneously."

Fifth, new industrial techniques cannot be resisted by deliberate inertia or wilful ignorance, as is done so often by trade unions or capitalists in free countries. There is but one authority to be cajoled into experiment and browbeaten by demonstration. Admittedly this one authority may be frightened and thus suppress a good new method altogether. But the more serious danger in practice is the very slow spread of methods proved correct by the best firms. This danger the system of central direction minimizes. Also trade secrets are forbidden: it is sabotage to conceal a technical discovery from the authorities or those whom, in other circumstances, one would call competitors. The inventor is liberally rewarded from state funds, and may not in practice take out a patent. Technical education, too, equals in quality and far surpasses in quantity the best Western examples.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Never underestimate the competition

Sixth, while competition still exists the object in a Communist society is not to divert profits from the other man to oneself (and not every measure conducive to this end benefits the community), but to be more efficient and productive than the next man. "Socialist competition" is not a fight but a race, and greater production is a direct, not an accidental or circuitous, result.

Seventh, savings are extracted much more successfully from the population by taxes than by lure of interest rates in a free economy. It is true that when the military and the police have had their due the Communists have not very much more left for investment than others. The U. S. S. R. invests a fifth or more, the U. S. and Great Britain about a sixth, of their net national incomes in defense. In the U. S. S. R. industry gets a much larger share and construction a much smaller share of the capital available than in other countries, so that to some extent Soviet industrial growth is the obverse of the Soviet housing shortage; but this does not remove the Soviet system's superiority in raising capital, nor explain why the whole national income, as opposed to that derived from industry only, has grown faster.

Eighth and last is the whole ideology of communism. Second only to class war, material progress is the criterion of value and the content of history. "Full communism," history's last stage, is a state of productivity so great that out of the ensuing plenty all men's desires can be satisfied according to need, without money or accounting. Yet this fantastic Utopia is taken very seriously: it is official dogma that the U.S.S.R. is even now moving toward "full communism," and the speeches of party bigwigs often end in a peroration on this theme. As Christian medieval Europe was building the City of God, so is the U. S. S. R. building material progress.

EXPERIENCE teaches that the thesis I am advancing rouses ugly passions and is easy to misunderstand. First, it should be clear that the thesis connotes no political sympathy with communism whatsoever; merely a certain respect for facts. Next, the rates of Soviet growth here given are not copied from official Soviet data; indeed, they fall far below such claims. Foreign observers build their figures on the Soviet national income carefully from its basic constituents, using the most reliable data available in each case. Documents captured by the Germans prove that, at least until the war, the vast bulk of Soviet published figures correspond precisely with the figures the Soviet planners themselves were using. The German documents reveal no falsification or bias in the statistics not already brought to public notice by complaints in official Soviet technical journals.

But what of falsification at lower levels? Suppose the Soviet planners were themselves deceived? Soviet managers and accountants very often

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cook their books, since if they cannot appear to have achieved the virtually impossible they lose their bonuses, perhaps their jobs, perhaps even their freedom. Sophistical as it may seem, this objection goes to prove beyond any doubt a slight underestimate in the rate of growth. For it is clear that in the early chaotic phases of planning, and again of postwar reconstruction, the opportunities and the need to cook the books were much greater. Later on, in the late thirties or again today, the banks and the auditors, not to mention the police, were more efficient; and the need to raise one's income by dishonest means was less. So if the extent of falsification probably diminished, the later figures were less exaggerated than the earlier ones, and the rate of growth is understated.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS arise because the word "productivity" might mean either output per man-hour of work or output per head of population. In more recent years the difference, though great, is not overwhelming. Thus, Colin Clark arrives at a growth of output per man-hour of work of over 4 per cent per annum in peacetime, while my own reckoning was 7.5 per cent per head of population. These are both very formidable figures, and could doubtless with some trouble be reconciled. In earlier years, 1928-37, the difference between the two measures of the rate of growth of productivity is much greater. For in this period growth was achieved by conscripting into industry the wives of industrial workers and the underemployed peasants from the countryside—a process that certainly raised output per head of the population very fast, but may well have actually lowered the average efficiency of a worker. It should be noted, however, that an economy which can put up enough factories to set such hordes of idle hands to work in so short a time is *ipso facto* efficient. The precise measure of the efficiency of the Soviet industrial system in that early period was its capacity to expand the number of factories and mobilize the labor force, in a way that no other backward country has found possible. Now that the surplus hands are absorbed, we perceive that their longer training and experience, combined with the other advantages of the system which I have set out, are raising production both per man-hour and per head of population at a frightening rate that no other developed country finds possible.

But take the spate of criticism in the Soviet press of this or that organizational shortcoming: Socialist competition has been reduced to a farce and a formality in Stalinabad, managers are extremely slack about introducing new techniques in Stalinogorsk, costs are inflated by nepotism and idleness in Stalino. Surely this shows that the organization itself is not efficient, by the Communists' own admission? I think not. For one thing these self-criticism campaigns are often deliberately exaggerated, in order to bring people up sharply. For another, self-criticism is precisely one of the system's stimuli. What we see here is the central power actually at work, bringing pressure to bear on the backward enterprises. One can infer the disease from the fact of treatment, but not the failure of the doctors. It is as if one looked at a free economy and deduced from the number of bankruptcies that it was inefficient. But bankruptcy is precisely the free economy's penalty for inefficiency, and the threat of it makes everyone else do better.

THEN, finally, it is useless to point to the U. S. S. R.'s low level of consumption. Consumption is growing, as it happens, very fast. It is no mean achievement, however high the starting point, to have nearly halved the cost of living since 1947, while slightly raising wages. Consumption fell so catastrophically before the war, and is so low today, and may fail to grow in the future, because of the failure of *agriculture*. It is correct that Tsar Nicholas fed his subjects better than Khrushchev. It is correct that this is largely due to the unpopular and inefficient way in which the Communists insist on organizing agriculture—and also to their predilection for ground-nuts schemes and their refusal to invest large sums in farm buildings, fertilizers, etc.; albeit agricultural productivity, as opposed to production, has grown quite a bit. Manufactured consumer goods, on the other hand, are comparatively cheap and plentiful, and the supply of them grows rapidly.

The non-Communist world's situation with regard to all this seems to me by no means desperate. Certainly perfect *laissez-faire* could not generate such growth, but in many respects the Communists have gone too far, and the free democratic countries do not need to imitate them precisely. Their governments have much more power than is required for economic growth. It is not nationalization the democracies need, but state power to rationalize: that is, to amalgamate enterprises, to enforce specialization upon branch factories, to standardize products, to dissolve restrictive cartels and trade associations, and so on. Most of these things occur under private enterprise, only much too rarely and slowly. In my view the whole formal and legal structure of private ownership can and should be maintained, but there should be occasional changes, imposed from above, of management and organization. In planning, again, what matters is that certain standards of efficiency be enforced, not that this or that particular product be produced or price charged. A central efficiency audit is a much more practical and less threatening proposition than a 100 per cent central plan; yet for economic growth it is much more desirable. Even with trade unionism, some aspects are less deleterious than others. The cherished right to strike for higher wages is a minor nuisance on the whole; it might possibly suffice to do away with the major evils —restrictive practices, apprenticeship conditions and craft demarcations. For while higher wages affect merely the value of money, restrictions affect the quantity of output. Indeed many American and Germar. trade unions have reached already this comparatively harmless state.

CERTAINLY, then, it is urgent that something be done, lest Communist industry out-produce the free world's. But this is a challenge to our will-power and forms of organization that we can surely meet. I believe that the political, human, and moral costs of Communist economic progress can be avoided by good sense and good-will. We can also rely upon the superiority of our agriculture, and, if we may lift our eyes from mere economics for a moment, on many other advantages besides. There is no call to wring our hands, but still less to put our heads in the sand.

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Spengler's Marionettes

HITLER. By Otto Dietrich. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. Henry Regnery Company. $3.95.

THE KAISER. A Life of Wilhelm II. By Joachim von Kurenberg. Translated by H. T. Russell and Herta Hagen. Simon and Schuster. $5.

BISMARCK. The Man and the Statesman. By A. J. P. Taylor. Alfred A. Knopf. $4.75.

By Frederick L. Schuman

IN *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* Oswald Spengler postulated a sequence of leader-types which he deemed characteristic of the transition from late "culture" to early "civilization" and thence toward decay. The steps of the Spenglerian descent are suggested by his table of "Contemporary" Political Epochs: Climax of Absolutism; Victory of Money over Landed Property; Domination of Money ("Democracy"); Formation of Caesarism; Victory of Force-Politics over Money; Increasing Primitiveness of Political Forms; An Imperium of Gradually-Increasing Crudity of Despotism; The World as Spoil. . . .

Spengler's scheme, like Toynbee's, derives from Greece and Rome. Its relevance to our own civilization is still debatable, despite Spengler's astonishing prophecies. But its applicability to modern Germany is striking. Spengler knew his Germans and, like Heine before him, foresaw what they would become.

The Germanic degeneration is starkly illumined in these new biographies of three leaders who dominated the Reich during the past century: Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), Wilhelm von Hohenzollern (1859-1941), and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). The biographers are A. J. P. Taylor, able historian, Fellow of Magdalen College, and University Lecturer in International History at Oxford; Joachim von Kurenberg, Junker, diplomat, and writer of many biographies, who died in 1954; and Hitler's Press Chief who wrote his recollections in 1946, while interned in a British camp, and departed this life in 1953.

Dietrich's book is less biography than reminiscence and *apologia pro sua vita,* reeking with the self-pity and feigned astonishment at self-hypnosis that are typical of other accounts by coworkers who were "deceived" by Der Fuehrer. Yet it furnishes new insights even beyond the scope of Alan Bullock's definitive biography of 1953. Kurenberg, "official" biographer of the last Kaiser, gives us a detailed story, at once critical, sympathetic and inconclusive, of the pompous monarch with the withered arm. Taylor, with his usual skill, paints a vivid portrait of the Iron Chancellor as a man of paradoxes. Readers less learned in European politics and diplomacy may be puzzled at times by Taylor's allusions and absence of documentation. His portrayal is nonetheless masterly.

BISMARCK, often typed as a stolid militarist, warmonger and Machiavellian schemer, here appears as a sensitive civilian and nervous opportunist, lonely, intolerant of criticism and successful in his major ventures less by design than by chance and the mistakes of his foes. Bismarck supported royal prerogatives and held liberals in contempt; nevertheless, Taylor makes out a persuasive case for his role as a constitutional reformer and builder of a *Rechtstaat.* "All he had in common with Hitler was a determination to make his will prevail, but parliamentary statesmen, too, have not been free from this weakness—or strength." Like other Junkers, he used public subventions to buy an estate and make himself an industrialist; he manufactured spirits and paper and used influence to secure government contracts. Always more the bourgeois than the aristocrat, he valued wealth above blue blood and power above both. Yet he used power, not for gain, vainglory, or crusading, but for the unity of the Reich and the peace of Europe.

In March, 1890, after twenty-eight years, he moved out of his modest and disorderly quarters at 76 Wilhelmstrasse, taking with him his 13,000 bottles of wine. His perennial bluff at resigning had been called by the young Kaiser—who, by alienating Russia, frightening Britain and rattling sabers on three continents, was destined to bring Bismarck's work to ruin.

Kurenberg's lively and compassionate account of the last Emperor, with a useful foreword, notes and appendices by Quincy Howe, is a drama in the grand manner of a ruler who was half-genius and half-clown, charming, intelligent, shallow, obstinate, opinionated, sentimental and bombastic. The story of this tinsel symbol of a tragic nation and a tragic era would be high tragedy were it not the tale of an absurdity, at first an anachronism and finally a holocaust. Kurenberg is quite right to contend that most Germans shared Wilhelm's enthusiasms for "shining armor" and "a place in the sun" and to imply that devotion to false gods was not a Teutonic monopoly. A year before he died the aged exile, in the interest of his revenues and at the instigation of his pro-Nazi wife, Hermine, congratulated Hitler, whom he detested, on the conquest of France.

The nemesis of the Second Reich shared one weakness with the builder and wrecker of the Third: inability to remember Kant's dictum, quoted by Kurenberg: "Flattery is the real destroyer of those who are great and powerful." Otto Dietrich's memoirs are unconsciously centered on this theme. Dietrich himself and all of Hitler's entourage and, indeed, the whole of the neurotic *Kleinburgertum,* abetted by the industrialists and the Junkers—all united in a pathetic quest for salvation through a Savior with a Sword

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—worshipped a scoundrel and mountebank as a deity and thereby made him a devil. The resulting hell must be explained away by the survivors in terms of incomprehension and betrayal. Although he plainly was not a party to the secret decisions of the elite, Dietrich's picture of the administrative chaos of the wartime Reich and of the political bankruptcy of Hitler's rule over Europe is a mighty indictment of power devoid of responsibility, wisdom and morality. For the rest, Dietrich's contribution is one of anecdotes and gossip, focussed on Hitler as genius, megalomaniac and schizophrenic. "In submitting to his leadership, the people enthroned his demon."

"War alles falsch?" ("Was everything wrong?") asked the embittered ex-Kaiser in Doorn. By the pragmatic test of results, as well as by the ethical test of human dignity and decency, much was false in the Kaiser Reich, whatever the merits of its founder, and all was false in the Nazi Reich. Each of these volumes is a provocative contribution to fuller understanding of the falsehood. All those who suffered from, and finally prevailed against, the Germanic madness of the twentieth century show signs of comprehension. Whether the new Germany comprehends, or merely laments failure without knowing its sources, only the future can tell.

Hindsight for the Future

A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT HIS PARTY. By Dean Acheson. Harper and Brothers. $3.

By H. H. Wilson

THE FORMER Secretary of State has written an enlightened and interesting brief for his party. In at least one section he has gone beyond his party and shown more courage and intelligence than one is accustomed to see displayed by political leaders. His book divides into three principal sections. The first seeks to explain why he became a Democrat and others should; the second analyzes the factors which should guide the conduct of foreign affairs; and the third is an evaluation of the unexpected consequences of our loyalty and security programs.

Though the first two sections could serve as party pamphlets and will convince only the true believers, they are not lacking in wisdom and shrewd observation.

Repeatedly the Democratic Party, says Mr. Acheson, has come up with great leaders who have left a lasting impression on the party. In contrast, he suspects that the Republican Party has preferred mediocrity of leadership and its really great leaders have left no mark on party policy. This may be a function of Republican conviction that Congress is capable of leadership, a "chronic inclination of the party to divorce power from responsibility," and a tendency to regard government as being no more than "an administrative process, like good bookkeeping." In his judgment the Democratic Party displays a greater hospitality to intelligence. It may be that "a policy of doing as little as possible requires less brains than one of anticipating trouble and of doing whatever is necessary."

FOR masterful skill in skating over thin ice and giving a touch of reality to the implausible, it would be difficult to surpass Mr. Acheson's discussion of the role of the South within the Democratic Party. Such diplomatic genius should satisfy Governors Shivers and Byrnes without convincing others. He has discovered Southern conservatism to be "an invaluable asset," presumably because "it gives the assurance that all interests and policies are weighed and considered within the party before interparty issues are framed." This makes the Democratic Party "one of the strongest cohesive factors in American life."

Two chapters on foreign affairs defend policies established under President Truman and continued reluctantly, Acheson believes, by Republicans. Perhaps the most significant observation is that major war is no longer a feasible means of accomplishing national purposes. Atomic war "is not an instrument of policy. It is the negation of plan and purpose beyond itself." This leads to the conclusion that we must have a type of military establishment able to use force "without involving the world in nuclear warfare." At the same time we must create in the non-Communist world the ability and unity necessary to resist expansion of Sino-Soviet power. Because the Republican Party would put first the balancing of the budget at a much lower figure, Mr. Acheson insists it cannot provide essential leadership. In rebuking the present Secretary of State he selects his "policy of instant retaliation" as an "almost classic illustration of the way a leader among free nations should not proceed."

In some respects Mr. Acheson's analysis of the loyalty-security program is the most impressive we have had. Certainly it has not been matched by any other prominent political figure. It reveals Mr. Acheson as a man of stature able to afford both the luxury of integrity and the exercise of intelligence. Almost the only reservations this reviewer has are derived from Mr. Acheson's acceptance of certain dicta taken from Professor Stouffer's *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties.* The data in this study are impressive within limits, but they in no way sustain the conclusion that "great social, economic and technological forces" are working for tolerance, unless this be equated with apathy and indifference. The Truman Administration perpetrated the system of secret-police surveillance of American citizens. "I was an officer of that Administration and share with it the responsibility for what I am now convinced was a grave mistake and a failure to foresee consequences which were inevitable." An obsessive fear of subversion produces the "one comprehensive evil . . . the compulsion toward conformity," without dealing with the danger of espionage or sabotage. In the illusory search for total security our misnamed "security system" has weakened the nation and created insecurity. Refusing to be sidetracked by escapist concentration on procedural reforms, Mr. Acheson sees that we must restore "an underlying political environment of faith in the freedom and dignity of the individual. Without that environment, legal changes are ineffective and frustrated."

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A Key to Kabuki

THE KABUKI THEATRE OF JAPAN. By A. C. Scott. The Macmillan Company. $6.75.

BALLET ANNUAL NO. 10. Edited by Arnold L. Haskell. The Macmillan Company. $4.50.

By P. W. Manchester

NOT MANY of us have had an opportunity to see the almost legendary theatre arts of Japan in their own habitat, and the majority of us never will. This book is probably the next best thing, because A. C. Scott seems to have overlooked nothing in what he modestly hopes will be a "useful handbook," but which is actually a meticulous and fairly exhaustive study of the Kabuki theatre, together with a briefer description of the No drama and doll theatre, both of which have had considerable influence on the development of Kabuki style.

In the first two chapters the essential background is mapped out. The Kabuki theatre grew out of the gradual rise of a merchant class which became more and more powerful as the ruling warrior class declined, and itself began to decline, after well over two hundred years, with the restoration of Imperial rule in 1868. Almost everything to be seen in the theatre today has its origin in that period which, in Japan, linked the Middle Ages with the modern world.

Mr. Scott also sketches in some essential features of Japanese domestic life without which it is practically impossible for the Westerner to have any sense of identification with an art which, elaborately stylized as it is, symbolizes for its own people a complete way of life.

Every aspect of the Kabuki theatre is covered; the music, the dance, costume and stage properties which play as important a part in the drama as the words and actions, and of course the acting technique. The art of the onnagata, or female impersonator, is dealt with at considerable length. Women are still banished from the stage of the Kabuki theatre, though in fact a woman was the first of all Kabuki dancers. The technique of the Kabuki dance is taught in various schools outside the theatre proper, and here women may and do perform it.

All kinds of fascinating pieces of information are sprinkled throughout the book. We learn that the instantaneous removal of kimona after kimona, which is a feature of certain dance plays as we saw from the visit of the Kabuki dancers and musicians last season, is done very simply by having them basted on with thread so that they can be swiftly removed by an assistant; that the shaved forehead, a feature of many of the wigs, dates back to the time when this was done by order to prevent actors from appearing too attractive, and that the ribbon which often covers the bare patch was the onnagatas' way of hiding the enforced baldness.

We have, too, the explanation of the observation invariably made by Westerners after witnessing a performance of No drama, namely that the audience seems largely itinerant, coming in and going out as it pleases. It appears that all No performances consist of at least three, and more probably five, entirely different plays, each in a different style. Obviously the spectators come in for the play or plays which interest them most.

A. C. Scott has written (and most admirably illustrated) this book out of a deep love and admiration for an art with which he was intimately associated for two years. He says, sadly, that economic conditions are slowly killing the Kabuki theatre, which is no longer the theatre of the people, and that the younger actor must look elsewhere, mainly to the cinema, for his living. How familiar and how melancholy it sounds.

If the Kabuki actors are, as he seems to feel, members of a dying race, at least they could hardly wish for a better monument.

THE NEW *Ballet Annual* does an indispensable job of putting into an easily obtainable and permanent form information about the main dance events all over the world during the past year. There are a lot of good pictures, the pages devoted to the Diaghileff Exhibition in London being of considerably more than passing interest, as is a vivid portrait in words of the late Constant Lambert by the English artist-designer Michael Ayrton. This isn't the best of the Ballet Annuals but it does not have to be ashamed of itself.

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A Flat Sort of Realism

TEN NORTH FREDERICK. By John O'Hara. Random House. $3.95.

By Stanley Cooperman

WHEN John O'Hara looks at an object—a doorknob or a face—he does not see it for itself alone. In the case of the doorknob he sees a particular kind of metal with a particular patina cleaned at particular times and bought at a particular place for a particular purpose. When he looks at a face he lists its name, what it does for a living, and whom it goes to bed with.

The process is simple enough, and since the world is full of doorknobs and faces, O'Hara is never at a loss for something to do. In his new novel, *Ten North Frederick,* he repeats the process for 408 pages. One must admire his staying power and admit the "realism" of his narrative. It is, after all, as accurate as the statement of ingredients on a bottle of catsup.

Cataloguing the sexual hypocrisies, quirks and assorted frustrations of the aristocracy in a medium-sized Pennsylvania town, O'Hara is disturbed by the falseness of appearance. He tells the reader that the social facade is false, and documents the charge with data showing where, when and in whose bedroom it is rendered false. After demolishing appearance, there is the problem of presenting reality. O'Hara attempts to solve this by listing as many points of information as his narrative will support. There is nothing vague in his book, neither nuance, modulation nor complexity.

The inventory, however, is a

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measure of O'Hara's limitations as a novelist. Unable to give any significance to events, unable to recreate experience, he issues external descriptions followed by series of "facts." The result is profoundly dull; after a characteristic listing of informative notes, one expects something more—some dimension of meaning. It never comes. Ultimately the details themselves become ludicrous—as when one asks an individual the time and he replies: "about twenty-eight and one-half minutes past three." When this mental set becomes predominant in a novel, under the illusion that what is being produced is "real," the result is altogether inadequate, both as art and as realism.

In *Ten North Frederick* John O'Hara has produced journalistic fiction without the social insight of Dreiser or the lyric sensitivity of Hemingway, and achieves documentary effects only with considerable strain. Rhetoric—even bloated rhetoric—is preferable to this plodding, dull man with the hard-boiled posture who does nothing with words, thinks in cliches, and speaks—in crude asides that break into the narrative—as pompously as any Babbitt.

Victoria's Gentleman

THACKERAY: THE USES OF ADVERSITY. By Gordon N. Ray. McGraw-Hill. $7.

By Jacob Korg

IN ACCORDANCE with his wishes, no biography of Thackeray was undertaken for many years after he died. One critic, observing that the great author's acquaintances were disappearing, lamented the fact that the chance of an authoritative Thackeray biography was dying with them. But it is hard to believe that even his intimate friends could have known as much about Thackeray as this biography reveals. He lived at a time when nearly every fact worth knowing about the private lives of educated people found its way into a letter or a diary. Gordon Ray, who has collected manuscripts by and about Thackeray for many years, has drawn his extremely detailed information from a large quantity of these first-hand sources.

Thackeray: The Uses of Adversity is the first installment of a massive two-volume work; it follows the novelist's development up to the time of *Vanity Fair*. It sees the first part of Thackeray's life as a *Bildungsroman* whose hero's character is gradually formed by his experiences. With the sensitiveness to atmosphere and personality which only an expert knowledge of a period can give, Professor Ray succeeds admirably in tracing the effects of Thackeray's various environments upon him. Charterhouse School taught him to value the virtues of upper-class society and frustrated his first attempts to distinguish himself intellectually. At Cambridge he won his first honors as a parodist and acquired a taste for lively and expensive idleness. The fortune he expected to inherit melted away just before he came of age; ever afterward he remained interested in the problem of people who, like himself, happened not to possess the wealth they were well qualified to enjoy.

FAILURE at college, poverty, the insanity of his wife and the comparative degradation of having to scrape together a living as a comic journalist did not crush Thackeray. On the contrary, he remained master of a really astonishing abundance of facetious humor, and became one of *Punch's* most valuable early contributors. However, these experiences did deepen and mellow his view of life, preparing him for the task of writing *Vanity Fair*.

Neither Matthew Arnold nor F. R. Leavis rank Thackeray as a great novelist, and he is, of all the important Victorians, the most difficult for modern readers to accept as a major artist. Perhaps the reason for this is his whole-hearted attachment to what now seems a merely contemporary social code.

Unlike Jane Austen and Henry James, who were aware of the psychological dimensions behind social behavior, Thackeray was content to describe social behavior with masterly authenticity and leave it to speak for itself. There is no doubt that he spoke with overwhelming force to a public that accepted the code of the gentleman as a living ideal, believed in the supreme value of the "domestic affections" and concerned itself with social proprieties and class distinctions. But to the modern eye his novels often seem to deal with matters of form or decorum rather than with real issues.

Professor Ray has no doubt of Thackeray's greatness, though he acknowledges that it is not the fashionable kind, but he has reserved his general critical interpretation for the next volume. The discussion of *Vanity Fair* which closes this one is a scholarly account of its contemporary importance. Thackeray's masterpiece, it is pointed out, transformed Victorian fiction; it shattered burdensome conventions, established realism as the dominant mode of the English novel and embodied, in its balanced structure, a distinction between the incidental and the essential in the Victorian ideal of the gentleman. All this, says the author, made Thackeray's greatest novel "quite as revolutionary a book in the development of Victorian fiction as *Ulysses* has proved to be in the development of modern fiction."

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The Orbits Around Freud

SCHOOLS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT. By Ruth L. Munroe. The Dryden Press. $7.50.
THE SANE SOCIETY. By Erich Fromm. Rinehart and Company. $5.

By Waldo Frank

Miss Munroe writes: "I am a psychologist, writing . . . for fellow psychologists, for social workers, for social scientists in variety, for doctors whose work lies outside the realm of mental disorder, for laymen with the patience to follow a lengthy, semi-technical account of ideas they hear about frequently. . . ." The highest praise she could win, and has earned, is the fact that she has succeeded. Here, in clear, conscientious, objective form, is a progressive ana-

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lytical description of the thought which has proliferated since Freud opened a new world to man's mind, sixty years ago. But Dr. Munroe is too wise to reach for the will-o'-the-wisp of absolute objectivity and impartiality. At the close of each chapter, differentiated from the text by double columns, she places what she calls "critical comment"; and here she reveals her own judgments which are remarkable for perspicuity and tolerance of positions other than her own.

After a general "Overview" which discusses the basic concepts of psychoanalysis, determinism, the unconscious and the genetic approach she proceeds to Freud and the Freudians (her own territory). Next come Adler, Horney, Fromm and Sullivan. Finally, Jung and Otto Rank. Perhaps she is unfair to Jung, but for a good reason, since she discusses him essentially as a psychologist, whereas Jung's importance rests rather in the fields of psychic paleontology and epistemology—realms in which the Freudians have too timidly followed him. On the other hand, she has done much-needed justice to Rank, whose great contribution is his unitary concept of self and of will, based firmly on German philosophy (particularly Schopenhauer)—a synthetic approach which Freud's positivism precluded. The reader who seeks a general view of this vast and still pristine field of human knowledge, and who is ready to read 600 pages of sober and sound prose, cannot err in procuring Dr. Munroe's volume.

DR. FROMM has long been distinguished among the leading psychoanalysts by his dynamic and critical approach to our Western society and by his defense of the neurotic's discrepancy from a social order in which alienation of *the human* has become axiomatic. In a sense, Fromm is the analyst par excellence of our cultural neurosis. In this book, he becomes openly—one might say passionately—the social critic. And in an epoch which takes seriously the masked complacencies of David Riesman, dished up in pedantic and not remotely original terms, a book such as this is doubly welcome. Fromm's critique of the capitalist ethos is courageous and keen. He leads constantly to the frontiers of that basic metaphysical view of man's nature which alone can validate a positive methodology. And as constantly, he draws back, failing to take the step across the frontiers which would make his contribution really creative. At the end, he falls into exhortation. As when he says: ". . . we can unite in firm negation of idolatry and find perhaps more of a common faith in this negation than in any affirmative statements about God." But much eloquent analysis has led up to this anti-climax.

Selected New Books

Sociology

SOCIETY. By Robert Ezra Park. Free Press. $5. The third and final volume of the collected papers of a pioneer American sociologist. Edited by his successors at the University of Chicago, the book comprises Park's more important articles and essays on collective behavior, news and opinion, and sociology and modern society. All twenty-one items are readable and most are still pertinent.

SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ACTION. By W. J. H. Sprott. The Free Press. $3.50. The Josiah Mason Memorial Lectures delivered at the University of Birmingham in 1953. Using social action rather than social relations or society as the basic concept, Professor Sprott reviews theory, method and research findings, leaning heavily upon American sources. The lectures seldom go beyond the introductory sociology textbook level except in style.

FLIGHT AND RESETTLEMENT. By H. B. M. Murphy and others. Unesco, Columbia. $3.50. Thirteen specialists on population and migration discuss the problems of refugees and displaced persons since the end of World War II, with an unusual emphasis on mental health problems in forced migration.

THE FEARS MEN LIVE BY. By Selma Hirsh. Harper. $2.75. A popular summary of what social scientists think they have learned about prejudice, especially as manifested in the "authoritarian personality." Useful for those unable or unwilling to examine Studies in Prejudices, the five-volume source of most of the ideas and data.

PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW—By Will Herberg. Doubleday. $4. "An essay in American religious sociology." The author's thesis is that both the religiousness and secularism of the American people derive from virtually the same bases. He leans heavily on such sociological concepts as the "triple melting-pot" for his analysis of the major religious groups. Not as original a contribution as the author's earlier Judaism and Modern Man, but probably more readable.

THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW. By C. Vann Woodward. Oxford. $2.50. An historian's short, plausible explanation of the not-so-distant origins and evolution of segregation and their impact on current race relations.

MILTON L. BARRON.

Belle Lettres

DANIEL DEFOE. A Study in Conflict. By Brian FitzGerald. Regnery. $4. The author of Robinson Crusoe is described as a versatile and energetic man. He was a businessman, a diplomat, a courtier, a pioneer journalist and a humanitarian. Defoe was an advocate of the populace, and when he was pilloried for one of his pamphlets, the people of London cheered him, drank his health and hung the pillory with garlands. A scholarly and colorful biography.

CREATION AND DISCOVERY. Essays in Criticism and Esthetics. By Eliso Vivas. Noonday. $5. Typical of the philosophic problems treated in these absorbing essays is that of literature as knowledge. There is a paradox in the fact that literature deals with the world of objective fact, yet seems at the same time to establish a self-sufficient realm. Thus, it is both discovery and creation. Professor Vivas concludes that, although literature can convey knowledge, its more important role is that of organizing experience into coherent forms, thus serving as "one of the conditions of knowledge."

JAMES JOYCE AND THE COMMON READER. By William Powell Jones. Oklahoma. $3. Intended as a guide for the uninitiated, this volume offers summaries and explanations of most of Joyce's works. Although it makes use of previous studies of Joyce, it does not pretend to give more than a simple treatment of a complicated author.

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THEATRE

Harold Clurman

I HAVE SEEN Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author* so many times—in France, Italy, England and here—that I am no longer sure I can evaluate it. What is certain is that it is a play which, to employ a French expression, marks a date.

Pirandello was the first playwright to dramatize the post-1918 sense of the splitting of the ego. Turgenev in one of his novels voiced the nineteenth-century feeling that "the heart of another is a dark forest"—meaning that it is difficult for men to understand one another; twentieth-century literature after the first World War increasingly stressed the notion that men cannot know themselves because man is not one but many; that there is hardly any dominant "I" in any man, but only a collection of disparate and often alien impulses.

Pirandello found an entertaining and theatrically original way of putting this sense of the atomization of human personality on the stage. Men cannot really comprehend one another or even be sure that they exist coherently for themselves—except through a work of art in which the artist, serving as god to his own material, fixes the truth and permits us to see men steadily and whole.

This is an essentially tragic view, although in Pirandello it takes on a hysterical and grotesque aspect, one might say almost a strident "laugh, clown, laugh" quality. Pirandello's work is a kind of tragic *commedia dell' arte*. His characters are puppets, his structure, for all its deliberate mystification, is schematic, and his tone a mingling of sideshow laughter with a shriek. The feeling one is usually left with after seeing a Pirandello play is one of disturbance: the writer appears to have been grinning with pain, and one is chiefly aware of his mordancy.

In the new revival at the valuable Phoenix Theatre, Tyrone Guthrie aims at having fun with Pirandello: the play's tragic center strikes one as an intrusion on a farce. The theatre folk, a director and his company, are rendered as mountebanks, and some of the stage business—particularly in the rehearsal scene in which the director, the most asinine of the lot, is shown to be incapable of entering a set without wrecking it—is hilarious. But though the play lends itself to a great variety of treatments, Mr. Guthrie's seems to me the least relevant. It eliminates almost every vestige of the play's anguish, destroys the tension between two worlds presented—reality and illusion.

I HAVE a further objection to the production. The theatre world itself (the world of make-believe) has its own pathos. A theatrical company is not necessarily composed of imbeciles. Actors are frequently vain and silly people but they nearly always have a certain naive credulity which is honorable because it is creative. Pirandello's text indicates this, and the actors' fumbling efforts toward understanding make their situation in the play almost as touching as the passion of the "six characters" to make themselves understood.

This is not to say that the production is without merit. On the contrary, it is brilliant. If I were giving a course in stage direction, I would instruct my students to study this production carefully for its resourcefulness and invention. How to make shock entrances and exits while no one in fact enters or exits, how to visualize every line or idea: "Man has dignity" somebody says as he is forced to crawl between another person's legs, "I am master here" the director says as he falls over the furniture; to make more graphic the caged feeling of the older son in the play, Guthrie has him stand under a ladder that somehow seems to imprison the boy in a mesh of taut nerves. All this, and how at all times to keep the stage alive with fluid, expressive movement, may be learned and enjoyed in this production.

But as a critic I am obliged to point out that this directional brilliance is used here for false ends because, for one thing, the director has no true sympathy with his text except as a scenario for his talented exercises.

Individually Kurt Kasznar, Michael Wager, Betty Lou Holland and some others are better than capable. Whitfield Connor in the crucial role of the Father could carry more weight if he were given a little more help. In any case, there can be little doubt that the play's truth has been sacrificed for high jinks.

Art

S. Lane Faison, Jr.

Pittsburgh

THREE YEARS AGO what had become a fusty sampling of all kinds of painting being done the world over took a radically new turn. Gordon B. Washburn, the new director of the Department of Fine Arts of the Carnegie Institute, in 1952 selected for the Pittsburgh International Exhibition of Contemporary Painting what he felt was most expressive of a period characterized by rapid flux and change. Contemporaneity was for Pittsburgh "the keynote for the development of a city which must never forget her role in the present, however wisely her citizenry might also preserve the great achievements of a human past." Thus Mr. Washburn offered the hope, rather archly perhaps, that the exhibition might play a part in upholding in artistic terms Pittsburgh's great industrial tradition.

Whether the citizenry of Pittsburgh rose to the challenge is open to some question. But in broader national terms the response was encouraging, if measured by critical reviews, museum purchases, the subsequent exhibition of a large segment of the show in San Francisco and the introduction to an extensive American public of such important younger European painters as Fritz Winter, Hann Trier, Leonardo Cre-

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monini, Vieira da Silva, William Scott, Raoul Ubac and Alfred Manessier. Most of these painters were seen again two years later at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, and all of them have reappeared in the second of Mr. Washburn's Internationals, which has just closed after being on view since October. The work of these artists was again among the most impressive shown. In my opinion, two of the three finest paintings were Manessier's *Crown of Thorns,* its tightly locked harsh blue labyrinth triumphantly projected against a ground of glowing oranges and reds, and Winter's *The White Line,* coiled tensely within a powerful massing of trip-hammer forms which are echoed deep within its pervasive blue space. The first of these, as many readers will recall, received the first prize; the second attracted no special mention from the jury. The third of my choices—it seemed to me the finest of them all—was by one of the jurors, and hence not in competition: *Underwater Hunter* by the Italian, Afro, a soft-keyed poem of aqueous distances traversed by luminous dark forms held together in shadowy suspension by their transparence and by their bold scale.

Just to have seen these three pictures was worth the journey to Pittsburgh, even though few of the remaining 325 were in the same class. From this trio I feel confident in asserting that painting in our time has engendered artists in France, Germany and Italy who are no longer engulfed by Kandinsky, Klee, Picasso, Braque and their fellows of two earlier generations, as are so many of their contemporaries.

Lest I seem to downgrade American production, much of which was extraordinarily fine, I name the following, whose exhibited work struck me as among the most coherent on view: Julien Binford, William Brice, John Ferren, John Hultberg, Willem de Kooning, Corrado Marca-Relli, Robert Motherwell, Jackson Pollock, Tom Rowlands, Ben Shahn, Lundy Siegrist, Hedda Sterne and Joyce Wahl Treiman. This extremely miscellaneous list is based exclusively on my reaction to the single work shown by each painter. It includes newcomers as well as artists of established reputation, Californians, New Yorkers, one artist from Illinois and an Ohioan living in Pittsburgh. It ranges from the rather slight but accomplished elegance of Binford to the searing but disciplined frenzy of de Kooning's *Woman VI,* from the new delicacy of Motherwell's paradoxically mural *Je t'aime* to the newly atmospheric grandeur of Hedda Sterne's *New York Number 15.*

AS I have suggested on other occasions, there is little point in proclaiming that American painting leads the world, or on the contrary that it lags behind production elsewhere. What should make us glad is that all over the world fine painters are at work. In addition to the trio cited at the outset, the following can be listed with enthusiasm: Bazaine (France), Birolli (Italy), Cremonini (Italy), Hartung (Germany), Matta (Chile), Miro (Spain), Nicholson (England), Okada (Japan), Richards (Britain), Scott (Britain), Tamayo (Mexico) and Trier (Germany). Again, this list was compiled from my reactions to exhibited works, and not with a view to international coverage. It could easily be extended, but not indefinitely, by citing established artists whose work is often more impressive than the examples shown in Pittsburgh: Brooks (U. S.), Davis (U. S.), Giacometti (Switzerland), Graves (U. S.), Singier (Belgium-France), Soulages (France), Tobey (U. S.), Ubac (France), Villon (France) and Werner (Germany).

Nevertheless the three dozen artists so far mentioned were responsible for little more than a tenth of what was on view. There were some other good paintings, but after they were accounted for, the quality plunged sharply. The exhibition as a whole suffered from repetitiousness, from scarcely absorbed modern cliches, and from merely competent work which in fifty years it will be nearly impossible to date in the middle of the twentieth century. I would like to be clear on this point: Botticelli's *Birth of Venus* is contemporary with Leonardo's *Adoration of the Magi,* and, despite profound differences of expression, each drew deeply from the experience of their age. The same can be said of a late Rembrandt and a Vermeer of Delft. On a similar basis I have not hesitated to join Ben Shahn with Willem de Kooning in the same sentence, whatever each may think of the other's work. Both say something valuable to me about the world I live in. On the other hand, Stuempfig and Koch do not seem to have come to grips with our present, while Connelly appears to pretend that Antonello da Messina is still with us. Wyeth's portrait of a boy is a brilliantly observed bit of Americana, but its forms are so devoid of invention that the picture makes no contact with history. Henri Focillon once said in another connection, *il faut prendre date.* To become dateless, we may freely translate, a work of art must have a date; otherwise it is merely dated. While my illustrations of this point are taken from American paintings at Pittsburgh, examples abound from most if not all of the twenty-two other countries represented.

This exhibition was less distinguished than the one of three years ago, but to say this is in no sense to agree with the tenor of much of the criticism which greeted the opening last October. The International offers us an opportunity to take stock of what is being done, and though this function is now partially taken over by smaller shows in New York and elsewhere, it is still our best opportunity. It would be shocking if we were to yield to Venice and to Sao Paulo the responsibility for assembling what might be called a visual counterpart of the United Nations.

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Music and Records

B. H. Haggin

THE TIME when prima-donna sopranos dictated tempos to the conductor was, I had thought, long past; but in a recent Metropolitan *Aida*, as in *Otello* last year, Tebaldi showed off her voice in phrases which she lingered over with no regard for the damage to their continuity, while Cleva held together the orchestra that was thrown off its stride. To say that this happened at the Metropolitan in the year 1955, that it was tolerated by a manager who has acted in many ways to tighten artistic discipline there, that it was rewarded with frenzied applause and yells by the audience, is to describe an appalling deterioration in performance and taste. And this deterioration showed itself further in a Rhadames, Mario Ortica, with a voice that was unattractive in timbre, constricted and tremulous; and in the yells with which the audience also responded to his bawling. Better singing was done by Nikolaidi, the Amneris, though with a voice that has lost its former richness and power, and by Norman Scott as Ramfis; the best singing by Bastianini, the Amonasro.

Tebaldi's hideous costume, which transformed her tall, bulky figure into an assemblage of bulges, her hair-do, her occasional attempts at stylized pose and movement—all these were new additions to the other unsuccessful features of this production. It may be difficult to achieve a triumph scene that an audience of today can take seriously, but Rolf Gerard's scenery and costumes seem to me worse-looking, and the scenery worse-contrived for the staging of the scene, than they might be; the stage direction, originally by Margaret Webster, includes such avoidable absurdities as Rhadames remaining seated in his litter after the king and his daughter have risen in his honor; and even the old-fashioned dances one used to see were not as laughable as the ones devised by Zachary Solow, which give me the impression all his work has done—of being produced, in the absence of the power of real creative invention, by sheer desperation.

The day after the Metropolitan performance I received the new Angel recording (Album 3525-C) of a Milan Scala *Aida*, with singing by Callas that was in striking contrast to Tebaldi's, not merely in its unusual vocal timbre, but in its unfailing concern for the musical phrase—a concern which shows itself in Callas's insistence on singing the concluding phrase of *O patria mia* without a break, as it is written. In this aria her voice and phrasing are exciting most of the time, but the sustained high C at the climax wobbles and is made strident by the effort to hold it. Similar exciting singing, similarly flawed occasionally, is heard in the rest of the Nile scene, and in the entire opera. Tucker's voice—cold, but agreeable, clear, steady and powerful—is like balm to the ear after Ortica and Del Monaco; Barbieri and Gobbi are excellent; and Serafin conducts effectively. The recorded sound of the orchestra is dry.

I have only now heard the earlier Angel recording (Album 3503-B) of *Lucia di Lammermoor*, with powerfully expressive singing by Callas in which her remarkable voice has more of its original bloom; excellent singing by di Stefano and Gobbi; and efficient conducting by Serafin. The chorus and orchestra are those of the 1953 May Festival in Florence.

Columbia didn't record the Metropolitan's production of the original Mussorgsky *Boris Godunov;* and on ML-4999, "Famous Operatic Monologues," it now offers George London's performances of the Rimsky-Korsakov falsifications of "I Have Attained the Highest Power" and "Ah! I Am Suffocating," together with Sachs's "Was duftet doch der Flieder" and "Wahn! Wahn!" from *Die Meistersinger*, Ford's "E sogno?" from *Falstaff*, "Pari siamo" from *Rigoletto*, and Iago's "Credo" from *Otello*. I find London's beautiful bass-baritone voice a little light in color and weight for the *Boris* excerpts; otherwise the singing is very fine; and Morel provides excellent accompaniments with the assembled orchestra. Excerpts from *Thais* and *Emperor Jones* are also on the record.

Angel 35231 offers a straightforward and effective performance (except for the momentary slowing up near the end) of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony by von Karajan and the Philharmonia Orchestra, with dry, edged recorded sound that remains dry in the first movement even with a 10,000-cycle cut-off. The record also offers Leonore's "Abscheulicher!" and "Komm, Hoffnung" from *Fidelio*, which require a dramatic soprano voice that Schwarzkopf doesn't have, but which she sings very beautifully with the same orchestra and conductor.

Von Karajan's performance of Beethoven's Fourth with the Philharmonia on Angel 35203 is mostly too slow in pace. Schwarzkopf's performance of "Ah! perfido" with the same orchestra and conductor is also on the record.

Angel 35258 offers the four *Fidelio* overtures played by Klemperer and the Philharmonia—the "Leonore" Nos. 1 and 2 played less effectively than the "Fidelio" and "Leonore" No. 3. The harsh sound of the Leonore" No. 1 and the distortion near the ends of sides require a 10,000-cycle cut-off.

It is long since I have heard the solo part of Mendelssohn's Violin Concerto played with such fine musical taste—which is to say without the usual mannered phrasing—as by Grumiaux with the Vienna Symphony under Moralt on Epic LC-3173. A good performance of Dvorak's Violin Concerto by Magyar with the same orchestra under Loibner is also on the record.

Ives's Symphony No. 3 and Richard Donovan's Suite for String Orchestra and Oboe, neither of which I find interesting, are played well by the Baltimore Little Symphony under Stewart on Vanguard 468.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 652

BY FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 and 17 down A sign that there may be someone waiting 28 and 10. (8,4,4)
5 Perhaps a horse plant. (6)
10 See 27 across.
11 Approves coercive measures. (9)
12 The drink has something almost too fluid in it, hence it's of no account. (7)
13 No clues permit of such advice. (7)
14 Simple but spiritual surroundings for me. (6)
15 and 7 down They certainly wouldn't be characterized by 1 and 17. (7,5)
18 14 might be plain, but this certainly isn't. (7)
21 and 8 down Implying a few feet must have been used up first. (2,4,4,4)
24 Is it a feature about me which suggests a working body? Quite the contrary! (7)
26 A rather flimsy tune? (4,3)
27, 28, and 10 across Bill evidently can't be pushed by one with a pipe. (2,7,2,3,5)
29 Is eager for a time to get two points. (6)
30 A cameo might make play hang rather loose. (8)

DOWN

1 Comparatively lengthy goodbye. (2,4)
2 The sort that want to get ahead limit debts. (9)
3 "Life with Father"? (7)
3 Rather pretty feature to the writer of the "Beggar's Opera". (7)
6 Turns to get credit thus. (2,5)
7 See 15 across.
8 See 21 across.
9 Criticizes (in anticipation of an opening?) (6)
16 Lynx-cat, i.e, not a truly authentic variety. (9)
17 See 1 across.
19 Crown-fighter. (7)
20 Summon me up, as an agent in time of danger. (6)
21 A figure can go to this for a change. (7)
22 Pig, in no shape for judging. (7)
23 Bore in front of this (at the bottom of the block, too!) (6)
25 Antony complained about his rent. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE 651

ACROSS: 1 SHAKEDOWN; 6 SPURN; 9 TWADDLE; 10 WARCLUB; 11 DRUMMER; 12 LAOCOON; 13, 19, 8 YES WE HAVE NO BANANAS; 15 TIERCE; 17 INTERN; 18 YIELD; 22 A-BOMBS; 25 COW; 27 CARIBOU; 28 ILL-BRED; 30 INSTALL; 31 KRISHNA; 32 RATIO; 33 and 26 WEE WILLIE WINKIE. DOWN: 1 SATED; 2 AS A RULE; 3 ENDEMIC; 4 OLEARY; 5 NEWELS; 6 SIRLOIN; 7 UNLOOSE; 14 and 16 EYE TO EYE; 15 TOWN CRIER; 17 IDA; 20 HARD-SET; 21 VIBRATO; 23 BELLINI; 24 MARSHAL; 25 CURLEW; 29 DRAPE.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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